CURRENT TRENDS IN TURKISH-BRITISH RELATIONS

ESUPA WHITE PAPER 01:

CURRENT TRENDS IN TURKISH-BRITISH RELATIONS[1]

Ozan ÖRMECİ[2]

Introduction

The United Kingdom (UK), more commonly referred to as “England”, “Britain” or “Great Britain” by the Turkish people, is a significant state considered one of the world’s most important political, economic, and diplomatic powers. Although far from its “superpower” status of the 19^th and early 20^th centuries, today the United Kingdom remains one of the five permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, the fifth largest economy in the world after the United States (U.S.), China, Germany, and Japan, a respected state with a well-established diplomatic tradition and continued influence in international politics, and a major, well-known, and respected power on the world stage thanks to its companies, universities, educated population, culture, and soft power.

In this context, this paper will analyse the relationship between Turkey (Türkiye) and the United Kingdom, both significant actors in international politics both in the past and present, from their historical development to the present day, including their various components. This study, conducted by a political scientist rather than a historian, will naturally focus primarily on the recent past and the current situation. To this end, it will first provide some basic historical information on bilateral relations established with the UK during the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey (Türkiye), summarizing the development of these relations chronologically. The following section will examine the main subject of the study: significant diplomatic contacts and agreements signed between the two countries in the recent political past. The next section will analyse the economic relations established between the two countries in recent years, followed by some important information on the cultural relations established between the two states. Finally, the most important agenda items related to each other in foreign policy and significant current developments in these areas will be evaluated. The last section will offer some predictions about the future of bilateral relations.

This research aims to create coherent introductory work accessible to everyone, drawing upon significant scholarly works on the subject, as well as various archival documents and secondary sources (newspaper archives, memoirs, etc.). However, given the temporal complexity of the topic and the multifaceted and dynamic nature of relations between states and societies, particularly since the 20^th century, encompassing numerous dimensions (political, diplomatic, military, economic, cultural, social, etc.), it would be appropriate to consider this work as a summary of a much larger and more comprehensive study. For more detailed readings, please refer to our expert work in English.[3]

1. Historical Background

1.1. Ottoman Past

Diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom (UK) and Türkiye (Turkey), two important and historically significant political and military powers in the world, both stemming from an imperial tradition, officially began in 1583 with the arrival of William Harborne, the first ambassador appointed by England to the Ottoman Empire, in Istanbul. The most significant event preceding Harborne’s appointment is the meeting between the British traveller Anthony Jenkinson and the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent in Aleppo in 1553, resulting in the granting of a personal trade privilege in Ottoman territories.[4] However, official relations began approximately 30 years later, with Harborne's appointment to Istanbul. Official correspondence began with a letter from Sultan Murad III to Queen Elizabeth I, granting trade privileges to three English merchants, and bilateral relations began to develop through the efforts of William Harborne (1542-1617), who oversaw this agreement.

William Harborne, an influential figure in trade, not only held diplomatic positions but also became a leading figure in Britain’s overseas trade with the Ottoman Empire. The main reasons that drove British Empire to develop relations with the Ottomans during this period were: establishing ties with the Ottoman Empire, a significant world power; marketing products such as fruit, silk, and spices from Ottoman territories to Europe; and meeting the island’s need for cheap raw materials during the Industrial Revolution. In addition, the idea that close relations with the Ottoman Empire could provide an advantage in the competition with Catholic Spain also influenced the British at that time. According to Dr. Nurcan Özkaplan Yurdakul, a specialist in British history, the most important issues that marked the early period of Ottoman-British relations from London's perspective can be listed as: protecting British commercial interests, protecting Christians and Christian cultural heritage, the patronage of the Greek Orthodox Church, and maintaining contact with India, the Empire’s most prized colony.[5]Akdes Nimet Kurat states that Queen Elizabeth I, unlike her predecessor who hesitated to establish relations with the “infidel Turks”[6],on the other hand, while noting the difference from Henry VIII, Brotton emphasized that in the bilateral relations established during this period, realpolitik (commercial interests and Britain’s struggle with Catholic Spain in the Mediterranean) was more influential than religious-civilizational differences.[7]

During this early period, thanks to Harbourne’s efforts, British merchants were able to trade with Venetian and French merchants with the privileges granted to them, and the French-English rivalry in Istanbul began to intensify. So much so that the French ambassador of the time, Jacques de Germigny, sent a letter to King Henry III in 1580. In his letter to Henry, Harbourne’s initiatives were mentioned, and the idea of disrupting Ottoman-English relations to prevent the loss of French dominance over the Ottoman Empire was discussed.[8] In this context, the French acted with a sense of competition against the English and, arguing that English merchant ships should also trade in the Ottoman Empire under the French flag, they portrayed the then English ambassador, Sir Henry Lello, as a “pretend ambassador”.[9] Nevertheless, thanks to the 1580 trade agreement, English merchants began to direct trade in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the power of the Levant Trading Company, in particular, rapidly increased.[10]

From the late 17^th century onwards, diplomatic relations between the two countries began to develop rapidly. According to Dr. Resul Babaoğlu, two important factors played a role in this.[11] Firstly, Russia’s expansion southward disturbed England, and the Anglo-Russian geopolitical rivalry, which would later be called the “Great Game”, led London to consider developing relations with the Ottoman Empire. Russia’s takeover of the Straits from the Ottomans and its access to warm seas could jeopardize the British Empire’s naval dominance. Secondly, England’s increased interest in the Eastern Mediterranean following the colonization of India made developing relations with the Ottoman Empire more attractive to London. Therefore, especially from the late 18^thcentury onwards, Britain occasionally supported the Ottoman Empire against Russia and consistently supported the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

The Ottoman Empire, approximately two centuries after William Harborne’s appointment, sent Yusuf Agâh Efendi as its Ambassador to London in 1793.[12] Yusuf Agâh Efendi was received by King George III of England in 1794 and began his duties in London. With this appointment, bilateral relations gained an institutional framework. The Ottoman Empire’s delay in establishing official diplomatic relations stemmed more from its self-perception as “arbiter mundi” (world ruler). However, it should be noted that there were also important temporary diplomats appointed by the Ottoman Empire to England before Yusuf Agâh Efendi.[13] But undoubtedly, the transition from temporary (ad hoc) diplomacy to permanent diplomacy is a significant turning point in the institutionalization of diplomatic relations. Yusuf Agâh Efendi, who set off from Istanbul on October 14, 1793, and arrived in the English port city of Dover on the afternoon of Thursday, December 19, 1793, had a very busy time in London. The Turkish ambassador participated in various social life activities and cultural events such as dinner parties, official and private visits, ceremonial processions, fireworks displays, and balls.[14]

During the decline and collapse of the Ottoman Empire, British influence and power over the Ottomans increased, making Britain, along with France and later Germany, one of the most influential states on the Sublime Porte. Relations during this period were not solely based on competition; London, unwilling to see the Ottomans fall under the control of Russia or another Western power (primarily France or Germany), occasionally adopted policies of solidarity with the Ottomans and support for Istanbul (as exemplified by the Crimean War of 1853-1856). Furthermore, London’s attempts to interfere in Istanbul’s internal politics and encourage the Sublime Porte to undertake reforms due to the Ottoman Empire’s military defeats against Russia became one of the fundamental characteristics of bilateral relations from the 19^th century onwards.[15] Indeed, according to some historians specializing in the period, even London’s support for the independence of Greece, which was perceived as anti-Ottoman, was primarily aimed at preventing the establishment of a Greek state under Russian protection.[16] Similarly, when more serious threats emerged in continental Europe, such as Napoleonic France, London could choose to pursue new strategic openings by turning to the Sublime Porte, even to a traditional adversary like Russia.

Anglo-Ottoman relations were a new experience for Britain, which until then had almost exclusively interacted with Christian-populated countries, and it was during this process that it became acquainted with Islamic culture for the first time. Although interactions in bilateral relations were reciprocal and the Ottoman Empire did not initially see Britain as its equal, it can be said that London gradually gained a significant advantage in relations due to its technological, military, and economic superiority. Indeed, Britain, along with France, played an undeniable role in the modernization of the Ottoman military – until German influence became dominant. In particular, during the ambassadorship of the prestigious diplomat Stratford Canning (1786-1880), who held ambitious titles such as “Turkey’s Reformer” and “England's Voice in the East”,Britain’s role in the political and military modernization of the Ottoman Empire increased.[17] Canning, reporting to London that the Ottoman Empire was considering establishing a new army during the reign of Mahmud II, emphasized that the Sublime Porte could not refuse a certain number of Christian officers and recommended sending British officers to the Ottoman Army. Another practice that improved bilateral relations during these years was the development of the Ottoman policy of sending students abroad, centering on Britain. This policy, institutionalized during the reign of Mahmud II, primarily targeted England; indeed, David Ross, an officer at the British Embassy in Istanbul, even sent Azim Bey and Ahmet Efendi, officers of the Imperial Guard, abroad for free education. London, during these years, saw educational activities as an opportunity to increase its influence in the Ottoman Empire. Mustafa Reşit Pasha, appointed ambassador to London in 1836, increased the number of students sent to Paris and London. Thanks to this, Ottoman intellectuals with a high level of English began to emerge, and the tradition of reformist intellectuals, which would later be influential in the Ottoman Empire, began to develop towards institutionalization.

From the 19^thcentury onwards, London viewed the Sublime Porte as a power that needed to be maintained against Russia, and developed policies accordingly. Indeed, Professor Geoffrey R. Berridge of Leicester University, author of the most comprehensive study on this subject, British Diplomacy in Turkey, 1583 to Present Day, shares this view.[18] In line with this, in a letter written in 1832 to Lord Palmerston by Stratford Canning, the British Ambassador in Istanbul (who had served intermittently as Ambassador and with various titles until 1858, having first been appointed First Secretary in 1808), the understanding of “keeping the Empire strong and prosperous” was emphasized. The reason for this was undoubtedly to limit the influence of other Great Powers on the Ottoman Empire, to be strong on the front lines for the protection of India, and to increase exports to the Empire in accordance with commercial interests. However, commercial interests, which generally guide British foreign policy, are relatively secondary in relations with the Ottoman Empire. For when the trade figures of this period are examined, imports from the Ottoman Empire to England accounted for 2 percent of total British imports, while British exports to the Ottoman Empire accounted for 3 percent of total British exports.[19] Therefore, preventing the Ottoman Empire from falling into the hands of other Great Powers (France, Russia, etc.) and protecting India and other colonies by making good use of Ottoman geopolitics, especially the Straits, became much more important goals for London. The importance of India, the “crown jewel”, to the British is undoubtedly related more to economic reasons. For British mercantilism at this time was based on the logic of a trade surplus; and the ideal country for this was India.[20]

Furthermore, with the Treaty of Baltalimanı (1838), which granted commercial privileges to the British, London’s support for the Ottoman Empire, particularly regarding Muhammad Ali Pasha and many other issues, visibly increased. In this context, steps began to be taken in line with the instruction given by British Foreign Secretary Lord Aberdeen (1841-1846) to Ambassador Stratford Canning to “bring stability to the Sultan’s rule through wise and well-considered reforms”,and reform and modernization were encouraged in the Ottoman Empire. During this period, it is also seen that British diplomacy began to increase its influence over the Ottoman Empire, and the British began to take the lead, especially in matters such as the protection of the rights of non-Muslims. The best expression of this period is the statement by Lord Palmerston: “Britain will support Turkey in the interests of Britain”. The Palmerston Doctrine also made everyone accept the understanding of preserving the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.[21] The Treaty of Baltalimanı is a historical agreement that is still a subject of debate in present-day Turkey and is criticized in nationalist politics for the loss of economic independence. Thanks to this agreement, the British abandoned their support for the Governor of Egypt, Muhammad Ali Pasha, against the Ottomans, but in return gained economic advantages.[22] However, some contemporary scientific economic studies have also argued that this agreement was beneficial in terms of integrating the Ottoman Empire into the global economy.[23]

The most significant issues creating problems in Ottoman-British relations during this period were: the British adoption of a “protected subject” policy as part of their efforts to establish influence over Istanbul, and their selection of personnel and dragomans almost entirely from non-Muslim Ottoman subjects such as Armenians, Greeks, and Jews, in line with this system which could be described as a “state within a state” (Imperium in Imperio). The remaining dragomans were chosen from Italian, French, Greek, and Levantine families within the Ottoman subject population, and belonged to well-known families such as the Fanton, Pizani, and Franchiri. These dragomans, designated as “Beratlı” (those with a charter) in Ottoman law, were able to remain Ottoman subjects while simultaneously working for other states thanks to this patronage system. However, the Ottoman State, believing this system encouraged disloyalty, took certain measures in later years. These measures began with the reduction of the number of “Beratlı” during the reign of Selim III. However, thanks in part to Ambassador Stratford Canning, who advocated for “friendly and pragmatic treatment” towards the Ottomans, Britain’s position in Ottoman politics gradually strengthened. Consequently, from the 1850s onwards, Ottoman-British cooperation deepened, and with the “comradeship in arms” that began with the Crimean War, British influence over Istanbul increased.[24]

The Ottoman Empire attempted to limit the number of local officials that Consuls could employ through a regulation published in 1868. However, this decision proved ineffective, and in 1867, foreigners were granted the right to acquire property, further strengthening their position. As a result, the number of properties owned by British Consuls and their subjects in places like Baghdad and Basra increased day by day, and even war materials began to be stored in these properties. Geoffrey R. Berridge categorized the British Consuls serving during this period into two distinct categories: “trading consuls”, who were primarily concerned with commercial matters, and “political consuls”, who became key figures in foreign policy.[25] In this context, the Baghdad Consuls were always closer to the Political Consul category. Furthermore, the longer tenure of Political Consuls, the fact that their salaries were not subject to controversy like those of Commercial Consuls, and the unquestioned authority of their positions are noteworthy details. The duties of Political Consuls can be briefly summarized as follows: (1) Encouraging Governors in the provinces to implement reforms, (2) Preventing violence against Christian subjects, (3) Anticipating and reporting developments that could have broad political and economic effects.[26]The fact that British Consuls became extremely powerful and influential in the countries where they served was evaluated by American International Relations Professor Michael W. Doyle in his work Empires (1986, Cornell University Press) within the framework of the concept of “Informal Empire”.[27] Indeed, during these years, there were some very influential diplomats who served in the Middle East on behalf of England, such as Harford Jones-Brydges, Claudius James Rich, Robert Taylor, and Sir Henry Creswicke Rawlinson.[28]

In the 20^thcentury, the principle of preserving the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, which had characterized the 18^thand 19^thcenturies and was associated with Prime Minister William Pitt (1783-1801), was abandoned. Britain’s policy of “keeping the Ottoman Empire afloat” was replaced by the idea of “partitioning the Ottoman Empire” in line with the “Eastern Question” approach. Indeed, from the 1880s onwards, the understanding that the Ottoman Empire, referred to as the “sick man of Europe”, would collapse gradually began to take hold in London, and therefore the positive view towards the Ottoman Empire changed. One of the first people to express this in England was Lord Salisbury, the Foreign Minister at the time, after the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878. During this period, although the modernization reforms undertaken by the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Abdul Hamid II and the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) were initially viewed with appreciation by British statesmen and intellectuals, and the Unionist administration that ended the Abdul Hamid era was initially seen as an opportunity to dissuade Istanbul from its alliance with Germany, over time, London began to increasingly adopt an anti-Ottoman policy due to factors such as the Ottoman Empire falling more and more under German influence, the increasing tensions and conflicts between non-Muslim minority groups and Muslims in the Empire’s territories (particularly the Armenian Question), and the effects of these on British domestic politics.[29]

London gradually began to move towards an anti-Ottoman policy. Therefore, the two traditional allies found themselves on opposing sides in the First World War. However, even in this war, the main enemy in the British mind was not the Ottomans and Turks, but Germany. This can be understood from John Masefield’s memoirs, which were recently translated into Turkish and alsocontain anti-German propaganda.[30] The most important development shaping Britain's Ottoman policy at the beginning of the 20^thcentury was undoubtedly the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916). The Sykes-Picot Agreement brought a new order to the region after centuries of Ottoman rule; however, this order was not permanent and began to transform after the Cold War. The Sykes-Picot Agreement, signed between Britain and France in 1916 and supported by Tsarist Russia, is a turning point because it envisioned the establishment of mandate administrations and areas of influence and direct dominance for Britain, France, and Russia in the Middle East instead of independent states.[31] With this agreement, many regions that had been under Ottoman control for four centuries came under British, French, or Russian rule.

To understand the British imperial policies implemented during this period, London, believing that the Ottoman Empire was entering a period of decline, began to worry that if Istanbul were ceded to Russia and the Caliphate remained under Ottoman control, the entire Islamic world would fall under Russian influence. Therefore, the British aimed to create a new Caliphate under Arab leadership and their own control, as opposed to the Caliphate institution held by the Ottomans and Turks.[32] This undoubtedly stemmed from the significant geostrategic and geo-economic interests that England held in the Islamic world (to give a concrete example; at that time, 90 percent of Baghdad’s trade was under British control). Furthermore, due to the power and prestige of the Caliphate at that time, Britain, fearing that attacks against itself would increase if this institution were under the control of the Turks with whom they were at war, increasingly focused on Arab policies.Furthermore, the fact that the Ottoman Empire fell heavily under German influence during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II and the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) also played a role in the British developing pro-Arab rather than pro-Turkish policies.Another reason for this change in British Middle Eastern and Ottoman policies was the shift from coal to oil as the main energy source, starting with the Navy in 1912, and the realization by British experts that the Middle East was an extremely fertile region in this respect. Indeed, the oil fields in Mosul, Kirkuk, and the Yarmouk Valley, as well as the potassium hydrate deposits in the Dead Sea (Lake Lut) in Jordan, were brought under British control during this period.[33] It should also be noted at this point that influential government officials working in the field, such as T.E. Lawrence and Gertrude Bell, who guided Britain’s strategic decisions at that time, also developed an emotional approach towards the Arab societies that had lived under Ottoman rule for centuries and supported the independence of the Arab peoples with somewhat romantic justifications. As a final reason, it can be said that the issue of India’s security, which was also influential in the 19^thcentury, remained important for London during this period, and the Middle East held geopolitical importance in terms of access to/transportation to India.

As a result of the British policy of inciting the Arabs to revolt against the Ottomans, symbolized by Thomas Edward Lawrence (T.E. Lawrence), known as “Lawrence of Arabia”, the Arabs, led by Sharif Hussein of Mecca (1853-1931), revolted against the Ottomans during the war with the promise of independence from the British. The imperialist British secret diplomacy of the early 20^thcentury did not stop there; with the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), they promised the French land in southern Anatolia, Syria, and Lebanon, and with the Balfour Declaration (1917), they promised the Jews land in Palestine. Influenced by the liberal politician and Prime Minister David Lloyd George (1916-1922), who was fanatically anti-Turkish and favored the revival of Byzantium, Britain pursued flawed policies, even keeping Istanbul under occupation for several years. However, after the National Struggle (War of Independence) initiated by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his comrades achieved success against the Greek occupation, they were forced to allow Turkey to gain its independence.

1.2. Republican Period

Despite being on opposing sides at times throughout history, particularly during World War I, the establishment of the Republic of Turkey (Türkiye) in 1923, which quickly modernized and transformed into a Western-style secular nation-state, and its adoption of the European political system and Western civilization as its reference points, generally resulted in a positive image of Britain in Turkey. Political relations developed on the basis of cooperation rather than competition. During this period, great respect also developed for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who twice defeated the British in the Gallipoli Campaign and the War of Independence. Atatürk proved his greatness by establishing friendly relations after the war with countries like Britain, Greece, and France, with whom he had fought on opposing sides in the War of Independence. Indeed, Sir Percy Loraine (1880-1961), who served as the British Ambassador to Ankara from 1933-1939[34] and managed to establish a personal friendship with Atatürk, sent a telegram to British Foreign Secretary Frederick Lindley Wood (Edward Wood) after Atatürk’s death, acknowledging the Pasha’s greatness.[35] During this period, British statesmen such as Lord Kinross and H.C. Armstrong also authored the first serious biographies of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, honouring the “Great Leader” of the Turks. In particular, the appointment of Sir Percy Loraine (1880-1961) as the British Ambassador to Ankara in 1934 and his subsequent actions had a very positive impact on relations between the two countries. Loraine’s personal friendship with Atatürk, and their playing poker together until dawn, greatly positively impacted relations between the two countries, and the traces of recent wars were quickly erased.

However, the normalization and development of relations took some time. This was due to the feelings of distrust that the political elites of the two long-established states, who had faced each other in the First World War and subsequently in the War of Independence, harboured towards each other. Indeed, even during the Lausanne Treaty negotiations, American diplomat Joseph Grew, evaluating the attitude of British Foreign Minister Lord Curzon towards the Turkish representative İsmet Pasha (İnönü), observed that Curzon tried to assert dominance by glaring at İnönü and acting like an “office boy”.[36] In addition, as Hale points out, the struggle between the two states over the control of Mosul did not end, and only with the Ankara Agreement of 1926, following the Sheikh Said Rebellion of 1925, did Ankara relinquish its rights in Mosul.[37] In the 1930s, while the two countries mutually continued their efforts to establish a comprehensive alliance, differing perspectives on Italy prevented this. While Britain viewed Fascist Italy under Benito Mussolini favourably as a force that could be used against Nazi Germany, Türkiye’s primary threat perception stemmed from Italy. Furthermore, Türkiye’s renewed rapprochement with Germany from this period onwards alarmed Britain, and British support played a significant role in securing Ankara’s sovereignty over the Straits through the 1936 Montreux Convention. London, anxiously following the rise of Nazi Germany and Adolf Hitler’s expansionist ambitions, initially pursued an “appeasement policy” associated with Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, but was well aware of the approaching danger and on edge. King Edward VIII’s visit to Istanbul in September 1936 and İsmet İnönü’s attendance at King George VI’s coronation on May 12, 1937, are concrete evidence of the warming relations during this period. During this period, Britain’s constructive policies also played a role in Türkiye’s securing control over the Straits through the Montreux Convention. Indeed, even after Atatürk’s death and İsmet İnönü’s ascension to power, this rapprochement policy continued, and shortly before the start of the Great War in 1939, a tripartite treaty was signed between Türkiye, Britain, and France.

The seeds sown during this period and the alliance agreement signed in 1939 between Britain, France, and Türkiye became even more visible with the outbreak of the Second World War. During this period, in line with İsmet Pasha’s policy of “active neutrality”, Ankara, which had been hesitant about entering the war on the side of the Allied states – fearing the disruption of its chromium trade with the Nazis – extended its alliance with Britain to the military field for the first time in years.[38] Britain, which provided significant military aid to Ankara during this period and offered even more, could not persuade Ankara to enter the war during the war itself – for this purpose, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill personally came to Adana in February 1943 to meet with Turkish National Leader İsmet Pasha.[39] After the war, Britain openly supported Türkiye against Soviet Russian expansionism. Indeed, after the war, while Prime Minister Churchill spoke of the “iron curtain” countries, Türkiye, faced with Stalin’s threats, strived to find a place for itself in the Western alliance led by the United States (U.S.), and within a few years, with the support of its new closest ally, Washington, and by participating in the Korean War, became a member of NATO in 1952.

Following Türkiye’s strategic choice after World War II to align itself with the Western bloc and its membership in international institutions such as NATO and the Council of Europe—with both Türkiye and the UK being members of CENTO/Baghdad Pact—relations between Ankara and London strengthened and gained an institutional character.[40] Consequently, although relations with the United Kingdom were somewhat relegated to the background after the U.S. assumed political and military leadership of the Western bloc following World War II, relations between Türkiye and the UK have progressed without major difficulties and have generally improved due to various shared political agendas, particularly the Cyprus Problem, and generally overlapping interests. The transatlantic ties and NATO membership played a crucial role in the politics of both countries, becoming the primary factor bringing these two states closer together during these years. Therefore, even if relations were not outwardly very close and mutual official visits were not very frequent during the Cold War period, the security-based alliance was built on solid foundations, and opposition to Communism and Soviet Russia served as the ideological and strategic cement of this relationship. During this period, relations were particularly built on strong foundations, especially on the basis of the “security bureaucracy” (military) and under the coordination of the U.S. The fact that the United Kingdom was one of the three guarantor states of the Republic of Cyprus – along with Türkiye and Greece – and that it sometimes adopted rhetoric and actions that reassured Turkish Cypriots and Türkiye in the face of the Greek Cypriot side, which was not a NATO member, also significantly contributed to maintaining Britain’s “friendly state” status.

According to Prof. Dr. Gürol Baba, who researched this period using British Foreign Office and newspaper archives, during the Cold War, the theme of cooperation far outweighed conflict in relations, and a spirit of mutual trust and alliance was developed based on NATO membership.[41] Economic relations, however, remained more in the background and overshadowed by Turkish-American relations. Nevertheless, the contribution and support of the UK to Türkiye’s infrastructure investments, particularly the Bosphorus Bridge, is a significant point.[42] Furthermore, the fact that many prominent Turkish political elites, such as Bülent Ecevit, spoke and followed English fluently, did not hesitate to follow the BBC and give statements there to keep up with international politics, and tried to adapt developments in British politics to Türkiye, contributed to the UK’s image, prestige, and power in Türkiye being quite good. Nevertheless, it is also important that the UK, from this period onwards, undertook some cultural initiatives in important centres such as Ankara and Istanbul, which served as prototypes of public diplomacy.

In the post-Cold War era, although British politics followed a routine of power shifting between the Conservative and Labour parties for several terms, there was no sharp break in relations with Türkiye. The spirit of alliance and friendly relations, whose foundations were laid during the single-party period and developed during the Cold War, were preserved and even improved in some respects. For example, during the Margaret Thatcher-Turgut Özal era, where a good chemistry was established based on anti-communism and thanks to market-oriented neoliberal conservatism, a clear improvement in relations was achieved. Some archival documents from this period reveal that Ankara, which received intense criticism from the European Community and European allies regarding democratic shortcomings after the military coup of September 12, 1980, was pleased with Britain’s pragmatic approach and had a warmer attitude towards London compared to other European capitals.[43] This conservative rapprochement under the umbrella of the “New Right” is discussed by Polat Üründül’s recent research, which examines this period and mentions the formation of a “special relationship” between the two leaders and states.[44] The key policies that brought the two leaders and states closer together during this period can be explained as: frequent privatization and deregulation to increase efficiency in the economy, conservatism based on respect for family values and religious people, and hostility towards old-style trade unionist-revolutionary left-wing movements and ethnic separatist movements (PKK in Türkiye, IRA in the United Kingdom). In fact, whether Thatcher was imitating Özal or Özal was imitating Thatcher became a popular topic of debate in the British media.[45] Thatcher’s visit to Türkiye in 1988, the first by a British Prime Minister since Churchill’s visit in 1943, was further evidence of the warming relations.[46] When they met again in 1990 for the 75^thanniversary of the Gallipoli Campaign, the two right-wing leaders had a dialogue that, according to British archives, revealed that they did not entirely agree on the situation in Cyprus and Rauf Denktaş’s stance.[47]

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the threat of Communism disappeared, and NATO and the Western bloc began to experience existential turmoil. However, it soon became clear that the West’s military alliance needed to continue in order to provide security to other states against states like Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, which challenged the international system, especially after the Gulf War. Indeed, the 1991 Gulf War was a significant development for Turkish-British relations, with both countries supporting the U.S. military action to varying degrees. During these years, Türkiye’s efforts to transition to a normal democratic life where civilian supremacy was accepted, and the rise of Islamist politics on radical foundations, were also important developments.

In the United Kingdom, the reign of the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher and John Major, which had lasted since 1979, ended in 1997 with the rise to power of the Labour Party under the young and charismatic duo of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. Blair, in particular, deeply influenced the Turkish left; The “New Labour” approach, whose philosophical/ideological foundations were laid by Anthony Giddens, who was at peace with the market and open to different identities and lifestyles, brought the SHP and later the CHP, which were strongholds of the left in Türkiye at that time, closer to the British Labour Party. During this period, the CHP, which was re-established with İsmail Cem, was guided by its young and charismatic leader, Deniz Baykal, who even came to be referred to as “Deniz Blair” in the Turkish media because of his imitation of Blair.[48] Baykal, due to his role in the Socialist International, closely followed the European left and especially the British left; however, in his political strategy, he believed that the dominant position of the army would be permanent in the system, and therefore he mostly hoped for opportunities during periods of crisis (“interim regime”) (the February 28^thprocess, the 2007 e-memorandum, and the Republic rallies crisis, etc.). Furthermore, relations progressed smoothly and developed without crises, and significant momentum was gained in trade relations, thanks to London’s support for Ankara’s EU membership process, its balanced stance on Cyprus, and ongoing security ties.[49] During this period, the issue of cooperation in security and intelligence came to the forefront again in a manner reminiscent of the Cold War era with the targeting of the British Consulate in Beyoğlu and the HSBC bank in the 2003 Istanbul terrorist attacks. However, this time, the elements under surveillance by the security bureaucrats of the two countries were not communists-leftists, but some radical Islamist groups (İBDA/C).[50]

In 2007, following the weakening of Tony Blair’s position due to his support for the U.S. in the Iraq War and the realization that the justifications for the war (the claim that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction) were not based on facts, a significant strategic document was signed between the United Kingdom, led by Blair’s Chancellor of the Exchequer and right-hand man Gordon Brown, and the newly elected reformist conservative AK Parti (Justice and Development Party) leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Through this document, shaped by Brown and his deputy Ed Miliband; Türkiye’s EU membership and reform process, the lifting of economic isolation imposed on Turkish Cypriots despite their support for the Annan Plan for a solution, Türkiye’s active participation in European security structures, cooperation in combating terrorism and crime, and the fight against radicalization are among the issues on which the parties have reached a consensus and created a kind of roadmap.[51] However, the Labour Party government, which has been in power since 1997 and has had concrete successes such as the dissolution of the IRA through the solution process and the implementation of important and lasting administrative reforms in regions such as Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom, will also end in 2010, and the long period of rule of the Conservative Party, which will last until 2024, will begin.

2. Bilateral Relations in the 2010s and the 2020s

In both countries, the rise to power of conservative forces and their mutual understanding led to talk of a “Golden Age” in bilateral relations in the early 2010s, influenced by “moderate” and “visionary” politicians such as David Cameron and Abdullah Gül.[52] During this period, economic relations developed rapidly, the project of spreading democracy in the Middle East and North Africa (Arab Spring) based on popular movements of what were called “moderate Islamists” and modelled after the AKParti government in Türkiye and democratically elected new generation Islamist leaders like Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was supported, a similar threat perception emerged regarding Russia's policies in Syria and Ukraine, cooperation projects in the military field and a common understanding on combating terrorism were developed, and both countries acted in harmony with the U.S. on many issues – especially during the presidencies of Barack Obama and Joe Biden, when Washington acted in a way more consistent with previous balances. Even during this most positive period, economic relations – especially from the perspective of the UK – did not actually reach a very significant level within the overall economic picture. Nevertheless, the period 2000-2015 can be seen as one of the most successful periods in terms of Turkish-British relations. This is because, during this period, Türkiye underwent a rapid democratic transformation with the hope of EU membership, the military’s role in politics was reduced, the state took action to find solutions to the Kurdish Question and similar structural problems that had become intractable, a full transition to a market economy was achieved, integrating the Turkish economy into the global economy, and strengthening its position in the Western world and international power centres. Furthermore, the fact that the U.S. had a very negative image in Türkiye and the Islamic world during the George W. Bush era due to the 2003 Iraq War (invasion) also increased the support of the UK in Türkiye and the Muslim world during these years, as the “less harmful Western power”.

The fact that the two countries participate together in several international platforms, primarily NATO, the Council of Europe, and the G20, and act jointly on many issues, are the most important factors bringing them closer. More importantly, there is no border (territorial) dispute between the two countries, no major political disagreements, and no fierce struggle for influence in a country and region where interests are directly competing. Therefore, despite occasional political disagreements and some societal prejudices, the relationship between the two countries is largely based on friendship and generally develops positively. In particular, the open and strong support given by the UK to Türkiye’s strategic goal of full membership in the European Union (EU) has, until recently, led to increased support for that country within Türkiye. Beyond this, the two countries have agendas that occasionally intersect, particularly regarding the Cyprus Problem, as well as their Middle East and global policies.

In their approach to these intersecting agenda items, it is observed that both countries show respect for each other’s sensitivities and generally adopt a style and approach befitting an alliance relationship. In addition, continuously developing economic and cultural relations prevent the relationship between the two countries from remaining solely in the political sphere, bringing not only the states but also the peoples closer together. The shared perception of threat developed recently against Russia’s policies in Ukraine and Syria is another key factor in the generally positive development of relations. Furthermore, the perception of British conservatism as highly respected by right-wing/Islamist movements in Türkiye, coupled with the presence of conservative-right governments in both countries in recent years, has played a role in accelerating relations.

In this regard, significant progress was seen in bilateral relations, particularly during David Cameron’s premiership. During Cameron’s first official visit to Türkiye on July 26-27, 2010, the 2007 strategic document was reviewed and renewed. During this visit, Cameron met with his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and stated that bilateral relations were at their best level in history. Speaking at the joint press conference, then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also drew attention to the developing trade relations and similar approaches in foreign policy between the two countries and praised the UK. At the same press conference, Cameron praised Türkiye’s multi-dimensional foreign policy approach aimed at developing relations with both East and West, and became the first politician to declare that a “Golden Age” had begun in bilateral relations.[53] The “Strategic Partnership Document”, signed on the occasion of this visit and an updated version of the agreement signed between Erdoğan and Gordon Brown in 2007, listed the areas planned for development in bilateral relations as follows: Bilateral Relations, Bilateral Trade and Investments, Türkiye’s EU Membership, Regional Stability and Peace, Cyprus, Defence, Global Security, Illicit Trade in Small and Light Arms, Combating Illicit Migration, Energy Security and Low Carbon Fuel Future, Intercultural Dialogue, and Education and Culture.[54] It envisioned further development of bilateral relations and an increase in reciprocal visits in the future. The document is committed to taking accelerating steps, particularly in the areas of mutual trade and investment. Prime Minister Erdoğan visited England on 30-31 March 2011 and 26-28 July 2012 on the occasion of the 2012 London Olympic Games, at the invitation of Cameron, and both visits were quite successful.[55]

In November 2011, then-President Abdullah Gül visited the country, becoming the first Turkish President to visit the UK since the 7^thPresident Kenan Evren’s official visit in 1988, a total of 23 years later.[56] This historic visit, a reciprocal visit following Queen Elizabeth II’s visit to Türkiye in 2008, received considerable attention from both British and Turkish media.[57] During the visit, Gül met with many high-ranking government officials and members of the Royal Family, including British Prime Minister David Cameron. He thanked the UK for its support of Türkiye’s EU membership and stated that the relations between the two countries were experiencing a “Golden Age”. President Gül also received the Chatham House Award, which he was deemed worthy of during this trip, at a ceremony held at Buckingham Palace. During this visit, a military cooperation agreement was signed between the then Chief of General Staff of the Republic of Turkey and the then British Minister of Defence, Philip Hammond.[58] Immediately following this trip, David Reddaway, the then British Ambassador to Ankara, who came to Trabzon to make some contacts, also supported Gül, noting that there had been a 40 percent increase in trade relations after 2009 and stating that the relations were experiencing their “Golden Age”.[59]

Towards the end of 2013, on the 10^thanniversary of the mass attacks by al-Qaeda in 2003, which included the British Consulate in Istanbul, then-UK Foreign Secretary William Hague visited Türkiye and stated that the UK was ready to support Türkiye in preventing al-Qaeda and ISIS-affiliated jihadist groups from exploiting the difficult-to-control long Syrian-Turkish border by taking advantage of the Syrian civil war.[60] This visit made it more visible that both countries, which had initially been receptive to the revolutionary movements in the Middle East during the Arab Spring, were gradually shifting towards a new approach where security concerns took centre stage. Indeed, in the context of the Syrian civil war, while the critical stance of the UK towards the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria diminished in the following months, the massacres perpetrated by the fundamentalist terrorist organization ISIS (DAESH) came to the forefront, putting Türkiye, which had placed the Assad regime at the top of its threat perception, in a difficult position in foreign policy. Therefore, after the Cameron era, when he tried to obtain approval from the House of Commons for intervention in Syria but failed, London changed its Syria policy. However, no statements were made by official UK authorities accusing Türkiye, but occasionally harsh articles appeared in the British media against Türkiye’s closeness to Islamic groups and its Syria policy.

The government of then-Prime Minister David Cameron supported Türkiye’s cross-border operations against terrorist groups, but stated that “the focus of the operation should be ISIS, not the Kurds”.[61]Furthermore, British Prime Minister David Cameron made two more official visits to Türkiye on July 26-27, 2014 and December 9-10, 2014. As a result of the second of these two-day visits, an agreement was reached on the establishment of a government that could represent all the people in Syria during the civil war and on preventing terrorist activities; a supportive position was expressed regarding the solution to the Cyprus Problem; support was given to Türkiye’s EU membership process; and an agreement was reached to work towards further increasing bilateral trade volume.

Apart from these, the “Turkey-UK Sweet Talk Forum”, established to strengthen and institutionalize civil dialogue between the two countries, has been held intermittently since 2011. The late Yaşar Yakış and Jack Straw, former Foreign Ministers of both countries, who served as co-chairs of the Forum at its inception, used this platform as a functional tool to strengthen bilateral relations. This event should be considered a high-level political and cultural activity that brings together political elites. The first event was held in Oxford from 7-9 October 2011, the second in Istanbul from 11-13 October 2012, the third in Edinburgh from 1-3 November 2013, the fourth again in Istanbul from 28-30 November 2014, the fifth in Bath from 11-13 March 2016, the sixth in Antalya from 24-26 March 2017, and the seventh in Reading from 11-13 May 2018.[62] Although not an official platform, Türkiye’s high level of interest in the Forum is presented as evidence of Ankara’s strategic perspective towards the United Kingdom. The current co-chairs of the institution are Reha Denemeç, Dr. Bülent Göktuna, Sir Julian Horn-Smith, and Jack Straw. The Turkish-British Sweet Talk Forum, while not yet a highly significant institution in bilateral relations, is a very important and beneficial platform in terms of opening a new communication channel between the two countries.

Theresa May, who served as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom after David Cameron (2016-2019), visited Türkiye on January 28, 2017, and announced the establishment of a “Trade and Investment Working Group” to discuss the future of trade relations between the two countries in the context of Brexit. Also during this visit, a document outlining the development of cooperation in the field of civil aviation security was signed, along with a “Heads of Agreement” between BAE Systems and TAI (TUSAŞ) regarding the “National Combat Aircraft” or “Kaan” project (TF-X).[63] Furthermore, security consultations conducted at the level of Undersecretaries of the Interior Ministries of both countries were restructured under the name of Strategic Security Dialogue (SSD) following this visit. In addition, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to the UK in May 2018 was quite successful – despite taking place during a period of intense criticism directed at Türkiye.

A significant figure in bilateral relations in recent years is Richard Moore, an experienced diplomat who served as the British Ambassador to Ankara from 2014-2017 and was subsequently appointed Head (Undersecretary) of MI6 in 2020. Unlike typical British ambassadors, Moore attracted attention during his time as ambassador with his media presence and, as a Beşiktaş fan, was embraced by the club’ss community. As someone who knows and loves Türkiye very well, he has become a key figure in bilateral relations. Also notable for his excellent command of Turkish, this British statesman has been one of the most active British ambassadors since Sir Percy Loraine, appearing on numerous live broadcasts on Turkish television and giving conferences at Turkish universities, addressing the Turkish people and students directly in their own language with his fluent Turkish.

Following Richard Moore, Sir Dominick Chilcott served as the United Kingdom’s ambassador to Türkiye from the beginning of 2018 until 2022. An experienced diplomat who had previously served in important countries such as Iran and the Republic of Ireland, Chilcott made statements indicating that Turkish-British relations would not suffer a loss of value during the Brexit process and spoke of positive bilateral relations in the post-Brexit era. Although Ambassador Chilcott was not as media-savvy as his predecessor Moore and served during a difficult period, no diplomatic crises occurred between the two countries during his tenure. Following Chilcott, Jill Morris was appointed Ambassador to Ankara in January 2023. Before starting her assignment in Ankara, Morris served as Ambassador in Italy and San Marino and is an experienced diplomat who also held diplomatic posts in Nicosia and Brussels. She is a recipient of the Honorary Order of St. Michael and St. George. Presenting a different profile as an ambassador with her blonde hair and attractive appearance, Morris is also active on social media. Türkiye’sambassador to London[64] has been Osman Koray Ertaş since the beginning of 2023, and he has garnered appreciation in the media for his friendly demeanour. The activities of the Turkish Embassy in London can also be followed on social media.

Despite this generally positive trend and the rapid development of relations, particularly during David Cameron’s premiership from 2010-2015, Turkish-British relations have become more stagnant since 2016. The main reasons for this are the negative perception of Türkiye’s evolving political system and foreign policy moves in Western public opinion and in the UK, and the diminishing influence of issues that fostered rapprochement in foreign policy. Particularly after the failed military coup attempt of July 15, 2016, the close relations Türkiye established with Russia, including military dimensions (such as the purchase of Russian-made S-400 air defence system), the Arab Spring process serving not the democratization of the region but rather the securitization of popular movements by states and the authoritarianism of regional countries and leaders, the deterioration of relations with the U.S. and the Western world in general, and the increasingly authoritarian transformation of the regime have made further progress in bilateral relations impossible. Therefore, a more stagnant period in bilateral relations began after 2016; however, no major crisis or polemic has occurred between the two countries so far. It can be said that the most fundamental point of disagreement between the two countries may be about the future of the Kurds. Although London’s official position on this issue is not clear and sharp, Türkiye’s military interventions against PKK-affiliated groups such as the PYD/YPG in Syria and Iraq are generally perceived negatively in the UK, as in the rest of the Western world, and their compliance with international law is debated.

In addition, the UK’s departure from the EU through the Brexit process, after being the European country that most strongly supported Türkiye’s EU membership until recently, has led to a more uncertain period regarding how bilateral political and economic relations will be structured. Moreover, the Turkish government’s record on democracy and human rights has changed considerably since 2016, and pressure on the opposition, domestic and foreign media organizations, and their employees has systematically increased. This, of course, causes concern and criticism in the UK, as in all Western democratic countries. Nevertheless, Oğultürk emphasized that the strategic ties between the two countries under the NATO umbrella were strengthened because the UK, unlike other Western states, provided early and strong support to the Turkish government after the 2016 coup attempt orchestrated by FETÖ.[65] A report from DIPAM, authored by Tolga Sakman, also noted that bilateral relations during the Conservative Party era after Brexit were defined as a “new multi-dimensional security relationship”, with particular emphasis on defence industry cooperation (TF-X/Kaan project and Eurofighter sales).[66]

In 2019, the appointment of Boris Johnson – the former Mayor of London and son of Stanley Johnson, a descendant of Ali Kemal, who served as a minister during the Ottoman era and was of Ottoman/Turkish descent – as Prime Minister of the UK, while not yielding concrete political benefits in the context of bilateral relations, was frequently discussed in the Turkish press as a potential softening of Turkish-British relations, thus keeping Turkish-British friendship on the agenda. Johnson, who constantly emphasized his hometown of Kalfat in Çankırı, was perceived as a sympathetic figure in the Turkish media as an “Ottoman descendant”, and despite the diverging strategic approaches between the two countries, particularly in the context of relations with Russia – Türkiye did not participate in Western sanctions and was unwilling to sever relations with Russia due to reasons such as high energy imports and balancing the West – good and close relations between London and Ankara were maintained. However, later, Turkish media close to the government and some international commentators suggested that after Johnson was forced to leave the Prime Ministership following various scandals, Johnson, who was very determined to support Ukraine against Russia, began to be written about as having prevented a peace agreement that did not include territorial losses for Kyiv.Therefore, after the dreamlike first years, Boris Johnson's government was later generally viewed negatively, partly due to the influence of major powers such as the U.S. and Russia on Türkiye, and the British administration of that period is portrayed in the Turkish media as a government that tried to disrupt Turkish-Russian relations.

Following Boris Johnson’s premiership (2019-2022), Liz Truss’s very short premiership (2022-2022), and Rishi Sunak’s administration (2022-2024), the United Kingdom attempted to establish new parameters for the post-Brexit era. The Conservative Party, preparing to hand over power, made efforts to negotiate a new free trade agreement with Türkiye during this period. In this new and uncertain era, London began to attach less importance to its relations with the EU, while it was thought that the importance of relations with non-EU NATO member states such as the U.S. and Türkiye could increase.A negative development of this period was the loss of the right of Turks to establish companies and obtain residence permits in the United Kingdom due to the abrogation of the 1963 Ankara Agreement for the UK. Furthermore, during the Sunak administration, an agreement was signed between the two countries to prevent illegal immigration from Türkiye to the UK. This agreement stipulated that Turkish and British police forces would conduct comprehensive joint operations against human trafficking gangs and boat trading. It was announced that a new centre would be established within the Security Organization and that data/intelligence sharing between the two countries would be strengthened. In addition, some initiatives in the context of public diplomacy by Turkish Cypriot Kenan Poleo, who has served as Consul General in Istanbul since September 2021,167 - and who, like Jill Morris, actively uses social media - and the provision of €781 million in funding by the UK Export Finance Agency (UKEF) to support the construction of a 286-kilometer high-speed electrified railway in southern Türkiye have also been among the most important topics of this transition period.

Subsequently, the long-established social democratic party, Labour, returned to power under Prime Minister Keir Starmer. Associate Professor Oğuzhan Göksel, one of the most knowledgeable figures on British politics in Türkiye, pointed out that while Türkiye’s strategic importance to the UK is a constant fact, given the democratic decline in Türkiye in recent years and the Labour Party’s sensitivity to human rights and democracy violations, unlike the highly pragmatic Conservative Party, various polemics and problems may arise between the two countries in this new period.[67] While this is a very logical approach, due to Donald Trump taking office in the U.S. and Starmer being a cautious leader, no significant crisis or polemic has occurred between the leaders of the two countries for the time being. Even Starmer’s silence regarding the arrest of Ekrem İmamoğlu, President Erdoğan’s biggest political rival and the CHP’s presidential candidate, led CHP leader Özgür Özel to criticize Starmer, the Prime Minister of the Labor Party (CHP’s sister party/ally), and President Erdoğan interpreted this as a “demand for political subservience”. The two leaders (Erdoğan and Starmer) last spoke on the phone at the end of February 2025. Currently, key issues in bilateral relations include the Ukraine-Russia crisis, the Gaza disaster, the new government and transition period in Syria, and the new phase of Cyprus negotiations, as well as the potential sale of Eurofighter fighter jets to Türkiye by a European consortium including the UK (other manufacturers are Italy, Spain, and Germany). Türkiye, in addition to its possible F-16 and F-35 procurement from the U.S., also wants to acquire 40 Eurofighters to strengthen its air force. According to Associate Professor Dr. Cenk Özgen, an expert in this field, many projects have been successfully implemented in the past regarding Turkish-Britishdefence industry cooperation, and there are areas for future cooperation as well.[68]

David Lammy, then-Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, is a figure who has made it clear in every statement that he values relations with Türkiye and describes Türkiye as “one of the important countries of the changing world.” In this context, in addition to the Erdoğan-Starmer duo, the David Lammy-Hakan Fidan duo could also become the most important representatives of relations in the new era. Fidan, who served as the head of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) in Türkiye for many years and is familiar with all the files, is trying to be an effective Foreign Minister in harmony with President Erdoğan. The two ministers met in London at the end of 2024 and made similar statements about the “indispensable” nature of relations.

3. Economic Relations

Economic relations between Türkiye and the United Kingdom have a long history dating back to the Ottoman era. Indeed, Türkiye hosts the second oldest British Chamber of Commerce, founded in 1887.[69] According to Berridge, British diplomacy in Turkey has developed a much more “doing business” approach since the 1970s.[70] Berridge notes that as economic relations intensified, the number of personnel at the Istanbul Consulate General also increased over the years.[71] However, the real turning point in this regard undoubtedly occurred with Türkiye’s inclusion in the European Union’s Customs Union in 1996, which rapidly increased Ankara’s trade with all European countries, including the United Kingdom. According to Sir David Logan, former British Ambassador to Ankara (1997-2001), then Prime Minister Turgut Özal permanently transformed the Turkish economy throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, replacing import-substitution industrialization policies with a free-market economy model.[72] The United Kingdom, though far from its former glory, remains one of the world’s most competitive and largest economies (ranked 5^th) with a massive gross national product of $4.26 trillion. Türkiye, with an economic size of $1.6 trillion, is currently the 16^thlargest economy in the world.

Türkiye has had a trade surplus with the UK since 2001 and exhibits a “net exporter” profile. The UK’s political approach towards Türkiye places a strong emphasis on maintaining and developing economic relations. For example, in 2010, during his first days in office at 10 Downing Street, Prime Minister David Cameron, speaking at an event organized by TOBB (Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Türkiye) in Türkiye, stated that they were “striving to double” the annual trade volume between the two countries, which exceeded $9 billion, within the next five years. He also mentioned several British companies, such as Vodafone, TESCO, and HSBC, noting that these companies were the three largest British investors in Türkiye. While Cameron’s expectation was not realized within the first five years, it was fulfilled in the subsequent period; Türkiye-UK trade volume steadily increased until the COVID-19 (coronavirus) pandemic, and interestingly, trade did not decrease significantly during the pandemic, maintaining its importance in bilateral relations.

Looking at current figures; in 2025, Türkiye’s exports to the United Kingdom were approximately $16,77 billion, while the United Kingdom’s exports to Türkiye were approximately $7,25 billion.[73] The total trade volume in 2025 exceeded $24 billion, making the United Kingdom the 7^thlargest trading partner of Türkiye, after China, Germany, Russia, the U.S., Italy, and France (total trade between Türkiye and the UK in 2025 is almost equal with the total trade volume between Türkiye and France in the same year). Looking at previous years, the United Kingdom generally ranked 6^thor 7^thamong Türkiye’s most important trading partners, reaching similar trade volumes to France. However, unlike many Western countries and totally different from Türkiye’s trade relations with China and Russia,Türkiye has a trade surplus with the United Kingdom. In this sense, Türkiye-United Kingdom trade is overwhelmingly advantageous for Ankara.

Year	Total Exports by Türkiye to UK ($)	Total Imports by Türkiye from UK ($)	Difference ($)	Total Trade Volume ($)
2022	13,004,798.469	5,904,555.654	7,100,242.815	18,909,354.123
2023	12,463,115.637	6,523,078.010	5,940,037.627	18,986,193.647
2024	15,288,583.560	6,845,512.583	8,443,070.977	22,134,096.143
2025	16,771,230.973	7,255,099,463	9,516,131.51	24,026,330.436
2026 (first 4 months)	5,396,594.094	2,321,786.554	3,074,807.54	7,718,380.648

The free trade agreement signed between Türkiye and the United Kingdom following Brexit – with negotiations ongoing for a more comprehensive agreement – has been central to trade relations between the two countries since 2021. The agreement is the fifth largest trade agreement the UK has signed with 63 countries. The agreement preserves the benefits of the Customs Union and reduces tariffs on industrial goods to zero. Looking at the most traded commodities between the two countries, Türkiye exports textiles and apparel, electrical and non-electrical machinery, motor vehicles and parts, and iron and steel products to the UK, while importing electrical and non-electrical machinery, automotive and related products, pharmaceuticals, iron and steel, and plastics and plastic products from the UK.[74] It should be added that many important British companies such as British Airways, HSBC, Tesco, BP, Shell, Vodafone, Marks and Spencer, Harvey Nichols, and Commercial Union operate in Turkey. Leading Turkish capital groups such as Vestel, Sabancı, Koç, Doğan and Doğuş also have some significant investments in the UK.[75]

It is also necessary to mention some civil society organizations that are beneficial in the development of economic relations. For example, the British Chamber of Commerce in Türkiye (BCCT), which is the second oldest British Chamber of Commerce in the world outside of England, was founded in 1887 by a group of British businessmen living and trading in Istanbul and has played an important role in developing trade and investment relations between Britain and Türkiye to this day. Maintaining close relations with the institutions and organizations of both countries, BCCT is also a member of the Confederation of British Chambers of Commerce in Europe (COBCOE), among the British Chambers of Commerce operating in approximately 70 countries outside of England.

The tourism aspect of the relations is also quite important. According to data from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, the number of tourists from the United Kingdom to Türkiye increased by 30 percent in 2022 compared to 2019, reaching 3.37 million. British Ambassador to Ankara, Jill Morris, stated that more than 3.8 million British tourists visited Türkiye in 2022, with 46 percent of them choosing Muğla. Morris also revealed that 1.2 million tourists visited Antalya. With these figures, the United Kingdom ranks as the third largest source of tourists to Türkiye, after Russia and Germany.[76]

Other notable factors in recent years include the depreciation of the Turkish lira, the desire to escape high inflation in Türkiye, and the increasing number of Turkish citizens buying properties in the UK for investment purposes. It has been observed that Turkish investors prefer luxury areas such as Knightsbridge, Mayfair, South Kensington, and Belgravia.This housing-focused investment trend provides a new example of the commercial dimension of human mobility between the two countries.

4. Cultural Relations

Although Turkish-British relations have not historically developed on a basis of hostility, for justifiable reasons, some negative memories of the First World War, and especially the Gallipoli Campaign (February 1915-January 1916) and the War of Independence (May 19, 1919-July 24, 1923), still remain fresh. The Gallipoli Campaign is considered almost the “Preface” to the Turkish War of Independence and is perceived as a positive event that brought the founder of the Republic of Türkiye, the Great Leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, onto the historical stage. In this sense, the Gallipoli Victory is still an important part of official Turkish history; within this context, England is naturally depicted in Turkish textbooks and official historical narratives as a hostile empire that used the soldiers of the societies it colonized (ANZAC troops, Indians, etc.) to occupy Turkish-Muslim lands. In the continuation of this process, England attempted to occupy Istanbul and Anatolia as a result of the Treaties of Mondros and Sevres, embarking on a great and misguided adventure that risked the centuries-old Turkish-English friendship. Therefore, it should be considered natural that there are some prejudices against Britain in Turkey. However, unlike countries such as Russia and China, where anti-Western sentiment has reached very high levels, Türkiye’s bad experiences did not radicalize the Turkish nation; on the contrary, with the measured approach of the great Atatürk – which Prof. Vamık Volkan calls “restorative leadership” – Türkiye was able to integrate into the Western world and the international system in a short time.

Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that both countries have demonstrated extraordinary competence in managing their relations to this day, despite some negative memories of the past. Indeed, in addition to the young Australians and New Zealanders who come to Gallipoli every year to commemorate their ancestors who lost their lives in the war, British statesmen have consistently participated in the historical anniversaries of the Gallipoli Campaign, trying to convey messages of friendship rather than dwelling on the bad memories of this tragic event. For example, in addition to the visit of the then Prime Minister, the “Iron Lady” Margaret Thatcher, on the 75^thanniversary of the war, the then Prince of Wales and now King Charles III also personally attended the commemoration ceremonies on the 100^thanniversary of the war, together with the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev. The British also took the Gallipoli Campaign very seriously, and some very important memoirs and analyses on this subject have been published in the past. An interesting work on this subject, recently translated into Turkish decades after it was written, is the famous poet John Masefield’s work, Gallipoli. In this work, Masefield praises the heroism of the British soldiers while also striving to glorify the Turkish soldiers and people.[77]

According to the 2022 results of the “Public Perceptions of Turkish Foreign Policy” survey[78], conducted annually by Kadir Has University, the United Kingdom ranks only 12^thamong friendly states with 19.2 percent support from the Turkish public. Indeed, for a large majority of the Turkish public (60.5 percent), the UK is not considered a friendly state. The fact that Germany is the only Western country in a better position than the UK can be considered a data point demonstrating London’s relative success in managing relations. However, a fundamental concern for the UK is that some Turkic-speaking (Azerbaijan, Northern Cyprus, Uzbekistan) and Muslim-majority (Qatar, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia) states, as well as China and Russia, which consistently perform better in such surveys, enjoy greater public support in Türkiye than the United Kingdom.

Despite this negative situation, the United Kingdom has established many active institutions in Türkiye over the years that cater to a small but highly engaged elite community in the cultural/social sphere. For example, the British Council has been operating in Türkiye since 1940,204 and not only teaches English but also introduces British culture to those interested. The first representative of the British Council in Turkey was Michael Grant. Grant’s successful initiative to employ English teachers at Ankara College eventually established a lasting partnership between the two countries. As a result, English is by far the most widely spoken and most popular foreign language (in education) in Türkiye today. British Culture language schools are also quite widespread and reputable in Türkiye.

The BIAA (British Archaeological Institute), founded in 1947, is another important institution in terms of cultural relations. The institute was founded by the renowned British archaeologist John Garstang from the University of Liverpool. The Institute was established in 1956 through a cultural agreement signed between Türkiye and the United Kingdom. BIAA facilitates and promotes research in a wide range of fields in Türkiye and the Black Sea region, including archaeology, ancient and modern history, heritage management, social sciences, and current issues in public policy and political science. BIAA is one of the British International Research Institutes (BIRI) and has offices in Ankara and London. BIAA also publishes the Cambridge University Press journalAnatolian Studies, covering history, archaeology, and related social sciences.

Another important cultural institution in Türkiye related to the United Kingdom is the Turco-British Association/TBA, or Turkish-British Cultural Association. The TBA was founded in 1951 to strengthen British-Turkish cultural ties. To this end, the TBA offers Turkish and English language courses, provides scholarships, and organizes conferences, exhibitions, concerts, and film screenings.

Finally, the Anglo-Turkish Society is a UK-based association founded in 1953 through the efforts of Edwin Bayliss, then Chairman of the London Borough Council, with the aim of strengthening and developing the historical bonds of friendship and understanding between the peoples of Britain and Türkiye. With approximately 400 distinguished members, the association organizes activities to develop cultural and social ties between the two countries.

In addition, a Yunus Emre Cultural Center was recently opened in London and has been warmly received by British society. Furthermore, the fact that Sadiq Khan, a Muslim politician of Pakistani origin, has been the Mayor of London since 2016, and the opening of the Cambridge Central Mosque in 2019, Europe’s first environmentally friendly mosque, which was attended by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, are positive developments in terms of social and cultural relations and inter-civilizational dialogue and cooperation.

In the field of education, England continues to be an attractive destination for Turkish students. The presence of British-educated individuals such as Abdullah Gül, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, and Mehmet Şimşek in high-ranking positions within the ruling AK Parti in Türkiye for many years further enhances the popularity of educational opportunities and activities in the United Kingdom. The fact that England has begun to treat the education sector as a commercial activity in recent years also strengthens this trend. Tens of thousands of students from Türkiye go to the UK every year for undergraduate, postgraduate or doctoral studies.

It is also essential to examine art and sports, which constitute an important dimension of cultural relations. In the field of sports, the Premier League, England’s top football league, holds a special place. Thanks to English football, which is very popular and widely watched in Türkiye, English football teams such as Manchester United, Manchester City, Arsenal FC, Liverpool FC, and Chelsea FC have hundreds of thousands of fans and supporters in Türkiye. Similarly, Gordon Milne, the English manager who led Beşiktaş to three consecutive league championships in Türkiye, is considered almost a sacred figure by the team’s fans in Türkiye. Many programs and broadcasts about the Premier League are aired on Turkish television channels, and sports-related broadcasts and interviews on YouTube are breaking viewing records.

There is also considerable interest in British music and cinema in Türkiye. Although they lag behind Hollywood in the film industry, British cinema enjoys a significant following in Türkiye. For example, the Marxist British director Ken Loach, who streams his films for free online, has a unique fan base among left-wing circles in Türkiye. More importantly, British film stars who have transferred to Hollywood over the years, such as Sean Connery, Anthony Hopkins, Kate Winslet, Hugh Grant, Daniel Craig, Idris Elba, Tom Hardy, Jude Law, Benedict Cumberbatch, Daniel Day-Lewis, Helen Mirren, Christian Bale, Colin Firth, Ralph Fiennes, Tom Hiddleston, Emma Watson, Michael Caine, Gary Oldman, Liam Neeson, and Keira Knightley, are far more well-known and loved in Türkiye than British politicians. Additionally, the legendary James Bond film series, produced by MGM and adapted from Ian Fleming’s popular novels, is a cinematic classic in Türkiye, much loved in the country and its new films eagerly awaited, thanks to its screenplays that occasionally take place in Türkiye (From Russia With Love - 1963, The World Is Not Enough - 1999, Skyfall - 2012).

In the field of music, British singer Robbie Williams, whose wife is Turkish, stands out as one of the foreign pop music stars loved by young people in Türkiye in recent years. Furthermore, popular British groups such as The Beatles, Pink Floyd, and Queen are still considered legendary musical groups by older Turkish music lovers. British female pop star Geri Halliwell, who recently achieved great success with the Spice Girls, worked as a hostess on competition programs in Türkiye for a period and is a very popular figure in that country. Also, British female singer Adele, known for her amazing vocals, has become a major star in Türkiye in recent years, as she has worldwide. In addition to these, according to Bağcı and Üründül, some British stars well-known in Turkey such as Dua Lipa, Sting, Ed Sheeran, and Anne Marie can be mentioned.[79] Perhaps Sam Smith could also be added to this list recently.

In recent years, alongside film and music stars, British-made television series have also become very influential in Türkiye and worldwide. For example, the “Sherlock Holmes” series, which propelled Benedict Cumberbatch to the top globally, has become one of the most beloved foreign series in Turkey. According to Bağcı and Üründül, other influential and popular series such as “Peaky Blinders”,“The Crown” (which depicted the life of Queen Elizabeth II and the Royal Family), “Merlin”, “After Life”, and “Fleabag” can also be mentioned.[80] I think the “Luther” series with Idris Elba and the new generation crime drama “Slow Horses” with Gary Oldman can also be added to this list. In this sense, the success of the British, especially in detective/intelligence films and series, is evident.

In the field of literature, several well-known English authors can be mentioned in Türkiye. For example, William Shakespeare, Ian Fleming, George Orwell, John le Carré, Rudyard Kipling, Graham Greene, and D.H. Lawrence are among the important literary figures whose books occupy prominent places on bookshelves and in libraries in Türkiye. Lawrence Durrell, the author of the famous Cypriot novel Bitter Lemons of Cyprus, is also an important figure for Turkish Cypriots. Turkish literature has also gained some interest in England in recent years, thanks to the works of popular authors such as Orhan Pamuk, Elif Şafak, and ZülfüLivaneli that have been translated into English.

Books by British researchers and academics are also very popular in Türkiye. For example, the sociology book by British sociologist Anthony Giddens, a theorist of the “New Left” and “Third Way” who also advised former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, has become a textbook used in almost all universities in Türkiye over the years. Furthermore, books on Ottoman-Turkish history, World War I, and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, written by British academics and researchers, are very popular in Türkiye and achieve high sales figures. Among the British academics and researchers who have written such popular books, Lord Kinross, H.C. Armstrong, Andrew Mango, and Norman Stone are some of the first names that come to mind. Professor Norman Stone, who taught at Bilkent University in Ankara for many years, mentored many students, including myself, and passed away recently, leaving a lasting positive legacy. Professor William Hale, who worked at Boğaziçi University for many years, is also noteworthy as one of the most important experts on Türkiye in the UK and, despite his advanced age, continues his scholarly publications, making significant contributions to Turkish historiography. Similarly, Professor Feroz Ahmad, who recently passed away after teaching at Yeditepe University for a considerable period, was of Indian origin and held both Turkish and U.S. passports. However, he was actually a product of the British academic school and was well-known in academic circles in that country.

In the UK, there are also various chairs, research institutions, and websites that conduct scientific research on Türkiye. Think tanks such as the Contemporary Turkish Studies program at the London School of Economics (LSE), headed by Professor Şevket Pamuk, Research Turkey and CEFTUS (Centre for Turkey Studies) are among the most important platforms that should be mentioned in this context.

British media outlets have also begun to attract more attention in Türkiye, particularly in recent years, in parallel with the increase in the English-speaking population. In this area, the BBC stands out as the leading and most popular television channel and internet news portal, while BBC NewsTurkish, which broadcasts in Turkish, is closely followed by Turkish citizens and students. BBC News Turkish attracts attention and creates a buzz by occasionally sharing its past news about Türkiye on its website and social media platforms. BBC Radio also has a loyal listener base, although not as large as before. Among newspapers, daily publications such as The Sun, Daily Mirror, The Guardian, The Times, and The Independent achieve high click-through rates online. Some time ago, The Independent newspaper also launched a Turkish internet edition called Independent Turkish. In addition, British Pathé recently decided to share its archives on Türkiye on its website. Popular studies on British history, politics, and foreign policy in Türkiye have also increased recently. In addition to works, especially the one which I co-edited with Oğuzhan Göksel and Gürol Baba, some recent works by Dr. Nurcan Özkaplan Yurdakul, the scholarly publications of Assoc. Prof. Dr. Önder Kocatürk from Istanbul University who thoroughly researches Ottoman-British history, and the recent works of Dr. Polat Üründül, a new generation researcher, can be mentioned. Furthermore, it should be noted that a new academic journal, Journal of Anglo-Turkish Relations, has been published since 2020 under the editorship of Prof. Dr. Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa.

In addition, according to data from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is estimated that approximately 400,000 people of Turkish origin live in the UK. A significant portion of these are Turkish Cypriots. Turks in the UK mainly work in the catering (food and restaurant) sector. In recent years, ethnic tensions based on identity differences between Turks and Kurds have occasionally risen. The Turkish media in the UK is also very diverse and diverse, with some newspapers achieving high circulations of tens of thousands, even hundreds of thousands, per week. However, among these publications are some newspapers close to the separatist Kurdish terrorist organization PKK. Although the social status of Turks in the UK is not yet very high, their loyalty to the state and respect for the law mean that racist attacks and stereotypical labeling directed at them are at a lower level compared to other Muslim communities. While the “Turkish kebab shop owner” image is quite common in the UK due to the significant presence of Turks in the catering industry, it isactually not such a negative or unsympathetic label when compared to common images of other ethnic groups.

Furthermore, in Türkiye, particularly in the Fethiye district of Muğla, there are nearly ten thousand British people who have settled in this region. These individuals, who have excellent integration with the local population, make gestures such as hanging Atatürk pictures in their homes, inviting both a priest and an imam to their funerals, and having Turkish flag motifs placed on their gravestones. These gestures are sometimes praised in the Turkish press and further increase the affection for the British. Although news of some of this population returning to England due to dissatisfaction with the situation in Türkiye has occasionally appeared in the opposition media in recent years, the tradition of British people coming to Northern Cyprus and Türkiye for holidays and settling there continues due to their love of the warm climate and the sea. It must also be mentioned here that Cyprus has a special position in terms of cultural relations. Because on the island, which was leased to England at the end of the 19^thcentury and became a British colony during the First World War, cultural interaction and sharing between the two ethnic groups have reached high levels as a natural result of decades of co-existence between the British and Turks. Today, in Northern Cyprus, the British and Turks live together in peace and harmony. On this occasion, hundreds of British-Turkish families and various business partnerships were established. In contrast to the more nationalist attitudes of the Greek Cypriots in the south, Turkish Cypriots seem quite happy living with the British.

5. Strategic Framework Agreement of 2026

In 2026, a significant development that went unnoticed due to the volatile situation in the Middle East was the signing, or rather updating, of a Strategic Partnership Framework Document between two Western states that are not members of the European Union (EU) but play important roles in NATO: Türkiye and the United Kingdom.

The agreement, signed in London on April 23, 2026, between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, Hakan Fidan, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Commonwealth and Development of the United Kingdom, Yvette Cooper, aims, according to BBC, to reinforce the existing strategic partnership between the parties and expand the scope of cooperation strengthened by close dialogue.[81]

In a joint statement to the press following the signing of the agreement, the Turkish and British sides stated: “The Turkey-United Kingdom Strategic Partnership Framework Document, signed today in London, provides a solid foundation for strengthening dialogue and cooperation between our countries, which share a historic friendship, excellent bilateral relations, a common perspective on a wide range of international issues and global challenges, including a strong commitment to the security and stability of the Middle East, and are NATO allies and strategic partners.” The statement also noted that the accelerating transition to a multipolar and fragmented international order on a global scale has placed Türkiye and the United Kingdom in a period of increased risks, adding: “The political and military importance of NATO, the cornerstone of our security and collective defense, has increased. NATO’s Strategic Concept, as well as its core tasks of deterrence and defense, will continue to form the basis of our cooperation in ensuring Euro-Atlantic security. Strong transatlantic relations are indispensable for peace and stability in Europe.”

The agreement, which received extensive coverage, particularly in the Turkish press, was generally presented as a positive development. For example, the state-run Anadolu Agency (AA), in an analysis of the issue, emphasized that bilateral relations between Türkiye and the United Kingdom, a NATO ally and strategic partner, were progressing positively in all areas, especially trade, investment, and the defence industry. Independent journalist Murat Yetkin, who provides important information on diplomatic matters, stressed in his blog post that the United Kingdom, a former superpower, now highly values its relations with Ankara, given its more limited capacity and the problems it faces with the EU and the U.S. He wrote that the agreement established a structure that would ensure regular coordination between Ankara and London in the fields of foreign affairs, defence, and intelligence.

The Ankara-London Strategic Partnership Framework, whose foundations were laid during Tony Blair’s premiership and updated during the long Conservative Party’s rule, continues to strengthen under Keir Starmer and the Labour Party. A key factor uniting the two countries is their close relationship with the European Union, despite both countries remaining outside of it. While Türkiye, in its membership process since 1999, gradually lost hope in Brussels, London finally managed to leave the EU at the beginning of 2020, following the Brexit referendum in 2016. In this sense, both states are well-suited to cooperate on many issues within their strategic relationship with the EU.

Another important issue is undoubtedly Cyprus. In Cyprus, where the UK maintains its influence through sovereign military bases covering approximately 3 percent of the island and its guarantor status, recent developments are causing concern for both states. While the strengthening of the idea of federation and unification with the Greek Cypriots in the Turkish Cypriot side, where Türkiye has influence, is somewhat understandable given the decades-long isolation of Turkish Cypriots, the protests in the Greek Cypriot side against the British military bases, which are under the status of sovereign British territory, are not a good sign, as they seem inexplicable. Both states derive their legal status on the island from founding documents such as the London and Zurich agreements and are not in an occupying position. In this context, it should be noted that even the EU membership of Southern Cyprus would become a matter of debate if the guarantor states did not accept it. In this regard, the recent rise of nationalist and anti-Turkish and anti-British sentiments in Southern Cyprus is meaningless and inconsistent with the island's traditional trajectory.

The third important element in Türkiye-United Kingdom relations is undoubtedly military cooperation. In recent years, Türkiye, unable to obtain the desired support from the U.S. and European countries, is increasingly turning to cooperation with the United Kingdom, as seen in the recent Eurofighter purchase. In this sense, the whims of the U.S. and European states have alienated Ankara and pushed it towards the UK. London, seizing this opportunity, intends to develop its relations with Ankara in every aspect. This cooperation could also lead to significant partnerships regarding Türkiye’s 5^thgeneration fighter jet, known as KAAN. In other areas of defence procurement as well, London and Ankara could cooperate more.

Finally, despite the increase in the number of “Breturn” supporters in recent months, the UK, generally advancing in line with its “Global Britain” vision, aims to develop joint projects and establish various collaborations with Ankara in the Turkic world and Türkiye’s immediate geographical region. These are necessary for London’s economic growth and maintaining its weight in global politics.

For all these reasons, the two countries are ideal partners in a strategic partnership. Our wish is for this friendship to deepen and for Türkiye to adopt a more democratic, British-style political system.

Conclusion

This study first examines the background of Turkish-British relations, divided into two separate sections covering the Ottoman and Republican periods, based on important sources and documents. It then summarizes significant political, diplomatic, and economic developments in recent years (the recent past) in relations between the United Kingdom and Türkiye, citing official documents, statements by heads of state, and news reports from reputable media outlets. The study then focuses on the rapidly developing economic and cultural relations between the two countries, providing a detailed overview of these developments. Finally, the newly signed Strategic Partnership Framework Agreement between the two countries is evaluated.

The study concludes that while the interests of the two countries are not as perfectly aligned in diplomacy as they were a few years ago, they are also not based on major conflicts of interest. However, the study also concludes that the recent assessment of a “Golden Age” of relations by high-ranking statesmen from both countries is exaggerated. This is because the two countries still do not fully align their policies on many important strategic issues, and there are policy nuances that may not be easy to manage, such as relations with Israel and Russia, and the Palestinian issue. Furthermore, there is no strong societal support for maintaining relations at a strategic level. Therefore, these two historical allies must overcome these difficult times by trying to understand each other and avoiding antagonism. Avoiding overly idealistic and unrealistic approaches and adopting a realistic rather than emotional approach to foreign policy, could be a good method for resolving problems or at least managing them without crisis.

A serious current risk is that, due to the confrontation between Ankara and the Western world, Türkiye, under the charismatic and powerful leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, may increasingly adopt an anti-internationalist rhetoric (“The World is Bigger Than Five”) and contribute to the disintegration of the system by questioning existing international institutions. This is a highly risky and negative development for the UK, and it is difficult to predict what might happen if the current UN order collapses. Unfortunately, the U.S. under the Donald Trump administration is also moving in a similar direction. This could be the biggest challenge in bilateral relations in the new era.

The traditionally more critical approach of Labour governments towards democracy and human rights is another risk factor for the near future, with Starmer-Erdoğan and Labour-AKParti pairings in power. Given the Turkish regime’s less diligent approach to these issues compared to the past, various controversies and crises are likely to occur in the coming days. In this context, it can be stated that the new administration at Downing Street is going through a period where it must act cautiously in its relations with challenging allies such as the U.S. and Türkiye. This challenge will also apply to countries and leaders like France and Germany (Emmanuel Macron of France, and soon Friedrich Merz of Germany).

Moreover, the current leadership change in the Labour Party and the emergence of Andy Burnham as the new PM could pose new risks for developing Turkish-British partnership. It is clear that Burnham, primarily a local politician, does not have an extensive formal foreign policy doctrine regarding Türkiye. In that sense, his views are primarily defined by a prominent domestic-versus-international spending dispute and the broader geopolitical outlook of an expected Burnham-led government.Burnham’s most public and direct interaction involving Türkiye occurred in July 2023. While serving as the Mayor of Greater Manchester, he faced severe backlash and factchecking after criticizing a UK government decision to back a £680 million loan for a new high-speed electric railway project in Türkiye.[82]Burnham tweeted a screenshot of the announcement, stating: “So we can't afford to keep our own ticket offices open – but we can afford to build a new line in Turkey?”. His position used Türkiye as a rhetorical contrast to argue against domestic austerity and infrastructure cuts in the UK.Political opponents and economic analysts heavily criticized his view, pointing out that the funding was actually a loan guarantee issued by UK Export Finance (UKEF). The financial backing was strictly contingent on Turkish buyers sourcing engineering, electronic infrastructure, and components directly from UK exporters, meaning it was designed to support British jobs rather than siphon away domestic funds.

As Burnham quickly transitions back to Westminster as the leading candidate to succeed Keir Starmer as Prime Minister, his approach to international allies is coming into sharper focus as well. In that sense, Burnham is committed to NATO and is expected to take a more hawkish approach than Starmer, with plans to potentially increase UK defense spending significantly beyond current fiscal constraints to meet international threats. Since Türkiye is a vital strategic cornerstone of NATO’s “southern flank”, a Burnham government will likely maintain robust bilateral security and defense ties. This focus remains highly relevant as outgoing Prime Minister Starmer is set to attend the upcoming NATO Summit in Türkiye, a transition point where Burnham’s team is actively scrutinizing the UK’s long-term Defense Investment Plan (DIP).

Despite these problems, it is clear that economic and cultural relations between the two countries and societies still have great potential for development, and much more effort can be made in this direction. For example, further developing the current bilateral trade volume, which exceeded $22 billion last year, establishing a Turkish-British University in Istanbul and creating inter-university cooperation platforms, think tanks, more intensive cooperation on security issues between the armed forces, police and intelligence agencies, and more political contacts between political leaders, civil society organizations and political parties are just some of the many issues that can easily be realized in the short and medium term. This is because the two countries do not have absolutely conflicting interests or clashing policies. More importantly, societies in both countries – unlike a century ago – no longer perceive each other as “enemies”. Therefore, despite all the problems, I believe we should be hopeful about the future of Turkish-British relations. Supporting these and similar well-intentioned efforts in this direction is our greatest wish.

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· Sakman, Tolga (2024), “Türkiye ve İngiltereÇokBoyutlu Yeni Güvenlikİlişkisi”, DİPAM Analiz, January 2024, no: 18, Date of Accession: 02.06.2026 from https://dipam.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Tu_rkiye-ve-I_ngiltere-C_ok-Boyutlu-Yeni-Gu_venlik-I_lis_kisi.pdf.

· Türkiye CumhuriyetiDışişleriBakanlığı, “Türkiye-BirleşikKrallık İlişkileri”, Date of Accession: 02.06.2026 from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-ingiltere-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa.

· Üründül, Polat (2023), “British-Turkish Relations from 1983 to 1993: The Emergence of a Special Relationship in the Ozal and Thatcher Era”, PhD thesis, METU, Ankara.

· Yeşilbursa, Amanda (2022), “Interview with Sir David Logan, British Ambassador to Ankara (1997-2001)”, Journal of Anglo-Turkish Relations, 3(2), pp. 161-172.

· Yıldızeli, Begüm F. (2024), “Turkish-British Relations during the Fall of the Ottoman Empire, 1870-1918”, in (eds. by Ozan Örmeci & Gürol Baba & Oğuzhan Göksel) Türkiye-Britain Relations: Two Hundred Years of an Intertwined Conflict and Cooperation, Lexington Books, pp. 39-51.

· Zengin,Can(2015),“İngiltere’ninSuriyeKrizindekiTutumu”,BilgesamAnaliz/Avrupa,No:1274,30December2015.

[1] This paper is prepared based on this previous work of the author: Ozan Örmeci (2025), İngilizJeopolitikYaklaşımları ve Türk-İngiliz İlişkileri, İstanbul: SarmalKitabevi.

[2] Prof. Dr., Political Science, President of ESUPA think-tank, Coordinator of UPA academic initiative, and Editor-in-chief of UPA Strategic Affairs.

ORCID:0000-0001-8850-6089.

Email: ozanormeci@gmail.com.

Website: http://www.ozanormeci.com.

[3] Ozan Örmeci & Oğuzhan Göksel & Gürol Baba (2024), Türkiye-Britain Relations: Two Hundred Years of an Intertwined Conflict and Cooperation, London: Lexington Books.

[4]Nurcan Özkaplan Yurdakul (2024), “An Overview of Ottoman-British Relations from the Beginning to the 1856 Paris Conference”, in (eds. by Ozan Örmeci & Gürol Baba & Oğuzhan Göksel) Türkiye-Britain Relations: Two Hundred Years of an Intertwined Conflict and Cooperation, Lexington Books, p. 13.

[5] Nurcan Özkaplan Yurdakul (2019), İngiltereOrtadoğu’yaNasılGirdi?, İstanbul: Kronik Kitap, p. 26.

[6] Jerry Brotton (2016), The Sultan and the Queen: The Untold Story of Elizabeth and Islam, New York: Viking, pp. 134-135. Quoted in Nurcan Özkaplan Yurdakul (2024), “An Overview of Ottoman-British Relations from the Beginning to the 1856 Paris Conference”, p. 14.

[7]Akdes Nimet Kurat (1953), Türk-İngilizMünasebetlerininBaşlangıcı ve Gelişmesi (1553-1610), Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayını, pp. 3-4. Quoted in Nurcan Özkaplan Yurdakul (2024), “An Overview of Ottoman-British Relations from the Beginning to the 1856 Paris Conference”, p. 14.

[8]Ibid., p. 17.

[9]Ibid., p. 18.

[10] Jerry Brotton (2016), The Sultan and the Queen: The Untold Story of Elizabeth and Islam, pp. 266-277.

[11]Resul Babaoğlu (2019), Türkiye’nin Soğuk Savaş DönemiKültürHayatındaİngilizEtkisi (1948-1965), İstanbul: Libra Kitap.

[12]Türkiye CumhuriyetiDışişleriBakanlığı, “Türkiye-BirleşikKrallık İlişkileri”, Date of Accession: 02.06.2026 from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-ingiltere-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa.

[13]Examples from the 17th century include El-Hajj Ibrahim Agha and Huseyin Cavus.

[14]Bülent Büber (2024), “18. YüzyılLondra’sında ilk daimi Türk büyükelçi: Yusuf Agâh Efendi”, K24, 18.01.2024, Date of Accession: 02.06.2026 from https://www.k24kitap.org/18-yuzyil-londrasinda-ilk-daimi-turk-buyukelci-yusuf-agah-efendi-4463; Emre Aracı (2013), Yusuf Agâh Efendi - 18. YüzyılLondrası’nda İlk Türk Büyükelçi, İstanbul: Pera MüzesiYayınları.

[15]Nurcan Özkaplan Yurdakul (2024), “An Overview of Ottoman-British Relations from the Beginning to the 1856 Paris Conference”, p. 23.

[16] Edward Ingram (1992), British Persian Connection, 1798-1828, Prelude to Great Game in Asia, London: Clarendon Press, pp. 256-257. Quoted in John Masefield (2025), Gelibolu, Translated by Ali Kurdoğlu, Ankara: HeceYayınları, pp. 8-9.

[17] Begüm F. Yıldızeli (2024), “Turkish-British Relations during the Fall of the Ottoman Empire, 1870-1918”, in (eds. by Ozan Örmeci & Gürol Baba & Oğuzhan Göksel) Türkiye-Britain Relations: Two Hundred Years of an Intertwined Conflict and Cooperation, Lexington Books, p. 41.

[18]Geoffrey R. Berridge (2009), British Diplomacy in Turkey, 1583 to the Present: A Study in the Evolution of the Resident Embassy, Brill – Nijhoff, p. 3.

[19]Ozan Örmeci (2020), İngiltere (BirleşikKrallık) Siyaseti, Kitap Yurdu version, İstanbul: Urzeni Yayıncılık, p. 534.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Begüm F. Yıldızeli (2024), “Turkish-British Relations during the Fall of the Ottoman Empire, 1870-1918”, p. 41.

[22]Nurcan Özkaplan Yurdakul (2024), “An Overview of Ottoman-British Relations from the Beginning to the 1856 Paris Conference”, p. 29.

[23]Şevket Pamuk (2005), OsmanlıEkonomisindeBağımlılık ve Büyüme, Ankara: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, s. 191.

[24]Ozan Örmeci (2020), İngiltere (BirleşikKrallık) Siyaseti, p. 431.

[25]Geoffrey R. Berridge (2009), British Diplomacy in Turkey, 1583 to the Present: A Study in the Evolution of the Resident Embassy, pp. 78-80.

[26]For details, see; Nurcan Özkaplan Yurdakul (2019), İngiltereOrtadoğu’yaNasılGirdi?, İstanbul: Kronik Kitap.

[27]Michael W. Doyle (1986), Empires, New York: Cornell Paperbacks, p. 39.

[28]For details, see; Nurcan Özkaplan Yurdakul (2019), İngiltereOrtadoğu’yaNasılGirdi?, İstanbul: Kronik Kitap.

[29]Begüm F. Yıldızeli (2024), “Turkish-British Relations during the Fall of the Ottoman Empire, 1870-1918”, pp. 39-40.

[30]John Masefield (2025), Gelibolu, Translated by Ali Kurdoğlu, Ankara: HeceYayınları.

[31]Can Zengin (2015), “İngiltere’ninSuriyeKrizindeki Tutumu”, Bilgesam Analiz / Avrupa, No: 1274, 30 December 2015, pp. 1-2.

[32] Nihat Karademir (2019), İngiltere’nin Kürt Politikası 1918-1932, İstanbul: Nûbihar, p. 14.

[33]Ibid., p. 15.

[34]The following are the Ambassadors the United Kingdom has sent to Ankara to date: 1920–1924: Sir Horace Rumbold, 9^thBaronet; 1925–1926: Sir Ronald Lindsay; 1926–1933: Sir George Clerk; 1933–1939: Sir Percy Loraine, 12^thBaronet; 1939–1944: Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen; 1944–1946: Sir Maurice Peterson; 1946–1949: Sir David Kelly; 1949–1951: Sir Noel Charles; 1951–1954: Sir Knox Helm; 1954–1958: Sir James Bowker; 1958–1962: Sir Bernard Burrows; 1963–1967: Sir Denis Allen; 1967–1969: Sir Roger Allen; 1969–1972: Sir Roderick Sarell; 1973–1977: Sir Horace Phillips; 1977–1980: Sir Derek Dodson; 1980–1983: Sir Peter Laurence; 1983–1986: Sir Mark Russell; 1986–1992: Sir Timothy Daunt; 1992–1995: John Goulden; 1995–1997: Sir Kieran Prendergast; 1997–2001: Sir David Logan; 2002–2006: Sir Peter Westmacott; 2006–2009: Nick Baird; 2009–2014: Sir David Reddaway; 2014–2017: Richard Moore; 2018–2022: Sir Dominick Chilcott; 2023–: CMG Jill Morris.

[35]Hikmet Özdemir (2010), Atatürk’ün Ardından Sir Percy Loraine’in Tanıklığı, Ankara: Remzi Kitabevi.

[36]Ebru Boyer & Kate Fleet (2021), “Great Britain and ‘a Small and Poor Peasant State’: Turkey, Britain, and the 1930 Anglo-Turkish Treaty of Commerce and Navigation”, Middle Eastern Studies, 57( 6), p. 906; William Hale (2024), “Turkey and Britain, 1923-1939”, pp. 53-66.

[37]Ibid., p. 54.

[38]For details, see; William Hale (2013), Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774, Routledge, pp. 56-77.

[39]Warren Dockter (2024), “Churchill Factor: Anglo-Turkish Relations and the Second World War”, in (eds. by Ozan Örmeci & Gürol Baba & Oğuzhan Göksel) Türkiye-Britain Relations: Two Hundred Years of an Intertwined Conflict and Cooperation, Lexington Books, p. 78.

[40] Gürol Baba (2024), “Turkish-British Relations during the Cold War: The Asymmetry between Conflict and Cooperation”, in (eds. by Ozan Örmeci & Gürol Baba & Oğuzhan Göksel) Türkiye-Britain Relations: Two Hundred Years of an Intertwined Conflict and Cooperation, Lexington Books, p. 95.

[41]Ibid., p. 105.

[42]Ibid., p. 97.

[43]For details, see; Ozan Örmeci & Ahmet Ceylan & Eren Alper Yılmaz (2024), “Turkish-British Relations in the Post-Cold War Period”, in (eds. by Ozan Örmeci & Gürol Baba & Oğuzhan Göksel) Türkiye-Britain Relations: Two Hundred Years of an Intertwined Conflict and Cooperation, Lexington Books, pp. 115-116.

[44]Polat Üründül (2023), “British-Turkish Relations from 1983 to 1993: The Emergence of a Special Relationship in the Ozal and Thatcher Era”, PhD thesis, METU, Ankara.

[45]BBC News Türkçe (2013), “Thatcher mı Özalcıydı, ÖzalmıThatchercıydı?”, 10.04.2013, Date of Accession: 02.06.2026 from https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2013/04/130410_thatcher_ozal.

[46]Ozan Örmeci & Ahmet Ceylan & Eren Alper Yılmaz (2024), “Turkish-British Relations in the Post-Cold War Period”, p. 117.

[47]Ibid.

[48]Ibid., p. 120.

[49]Ibid., pp. 119-120.

[50]Ibid., pp. 120-121.

[51]Ibid., p. 122.

[52]Ozan Örmeci (2016), “Son Yıllarda Türkiye-BirleşikKrallık (İngiltere) İlişkileri: İlişkilerde ‘Altın Çağ’ Dönemi Mi?”, Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesiİktisadi ve İdariBilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, 21(2), pp. 589-621.

[53]Hürriyet (2010), “Türkiye-İngiltereilişkilerinde ‘altınçağ’”, 27.07.2010, Date of Accession: 02.06.2026 from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/turkiye-ingiltere-iliskilerinde-altin-cag-15426304.

[54] Türkiye CumhuriyetiDışişleriBakanlığı, “Türkiye-BirleşikKrallık İlişkileri”, Date of Accession: 02.06.2026 from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-ingiltere-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa.

[55] Ozan Örmeci (2020), İngiltere (BirleşikKrallık) Siyaseti, p. 543.

[56] Prior to Evren, the last visit at the presidential level was made by Cevdet Sunay in 1967.

[57]NTV (2011), “Gül’denİngiltere’yetarihiziyaret”, 20.11.2011, Date of Accession: 02.06.2026 from http://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/gulden-ingiltereye-tarihi-ziyaret,HJXj2ZCrj Eykb6ZEBKP3Ig.

[58] Parliament.uk, “UK-Turkey relations and Turkey’s regional role - Foreign Affairs Committee”, Date of Accession: 02.06.2026 from http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmfaff/1567/156706.htm.

[59]Habertürk (2011), “İngiltereile Türkiye ilişkilerialtınçağınıyaşıyor”, 13.12.2011, Date of Accession: 02.06.2026 from http://www.haberturk.com/dunya/haber/696762-ingiltere-ile-turkiye-iliskileri-altin-cagini-yasiyor.

[60]Amerika’nın Sesi (2013), “İngiltere-Türkiye İlişkileri Gelişiyor mu?”, 22.11.2013, Date of Accession: 02.06.2026 from http://www.amerikaninsesi.com/content/ingiltere-turkiye-iliskileri-gelisiyor-mu/1795742.html.

[61] Ozan Örmeci (2020), İngiltere (BirleşikKrallık) Siyaseti, p. 545.

[62]Hürriyet (2018), “Tatlı Dil Forumunedir?”, 08.05.2018, Date of Accession: 02.06.2026 from https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/tatli-dil-forumu-nedir-40829509.

[63]Ozan Örmeci (2020), İngiltere (BirleşikKrallık) Siyaseti, pp. 546-547.

[64] The following individuals have served as Türkiye’s ambassador to London: Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk (1924–1924) Zekai Apaydın (1924–1925); Ferit Tek (1925–1932); Münir Ertegün (1932–1934); Ali Fethi Okyar (1934–1939); Tevfik Rüştü Aras (1939–1942); Rauf Orbay (1942–1944); Ruşen Eşref Ünaydın (1944–1945); M. Cevat Açıkalın (1945–1952); Hüseyin RagıpBaydur (1952–1955); Suat Hayri Ürgüplü (1955–1957);Muharrem Nuri Birgi (1957–1960); Feridun Cemal Erkin (1960–1962); Kemal N. Kavur (1962–1963); Zeki Kuneralp (1964–1966); Ümit Haluk Bayülken (1966–1969); Zeki Kuneralp (1969–1972); Turgut Menemencioğlu (1972–1978); Vahap Aşiroğlu (1978–1981); Rahmi Gümrükçüoğlu (1981–1988); NurverNureş (1989–1991); Candemir Önhon (1991–1995); Özden Sanberk (1995–2000); Korkmaz Haktanır (2000–2002); Akın Alptuna (2003–2007); Mehmet Yiğit Alpogan (2007–2010); Ahmet Ünal Çeviköz (2010–2014); Abdurrahman Bilgiç (2014–2018); Ümit Yalçın (2018–2023);

Osman Koray Ertaş (2023–).

[65]M. Cem Oğultürk (2024), “Turkish-British Relations within the Framework of NATO”, in (eds. by Ozan Örmeci & Gürol Baba & Oğuzhan Göksel) Türkiye-Britain Relations: Two Hundred Years of an Intertwined Conflict and Cooperation, Lexington Books, pp. 201-219.

[66]TolgaSakman (2024), “Türkiye ve İngiltereÇokBoyutlu Yeni Güvenlikİlişkisi”, DİPAM Analiz, January 2024, no: 18, Date of Accession: 02.06.2026 from https://dipam.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Tu_rkiye-ve-I_ngiltere-C_ok-Boyutlu-Yeni-Gu_venlik-I_lis_kisi.pdf.

[67]Oğuzhan Göksel (2024), “Geopolitical Partner or Ideological Opponent? The Approach of British Political Parties toward Türkiye”, in (eds. by Ozan Örmeci & Gürol Baba & Oğuzhan Göksel) Türkiye-Britain Relations: Two Hundred Years of an Intertwined Conflict and Cooperation, Lexington Books, pp. 181-197.

[68]Cenk Özgen (2024), “Defence Industry Aspect of Recent Turkish-British Relations”, in (eds. by Ozan Örmeci & Gürol Baba & Oğuzhan Göksel) Türkiye-Britain Relations: Two Hundred Years of an Intertwined Conflict and Cooperation, Lexington Books, pp. 239-255.

[69] Ozan Örmeci & Ahmet Ceylan & Eren Alper Yılmaz (2024), “Turkish-British Relations in the Post-Cold War Period”, p 131.

[70]Geoffrey R. Berridge (2009), British Diplomacy in Turkey, 1583 to the Present: A Study in the Evolution of the Resident Embassy, p. 237.

[71]Ibid., p. 267.

[72]Amanda Yeşilbursa (2022), “Interview with Sir David Logan, British Ambassador to Ankara (1997-2001)”, Journal of Anglo-Turkish Relations, 3(2), p. 163.

[73]Ozan Örmeci (2025), İngilizJeopolitikYaklaşımları ve Türk-İngiliz İlişkileri, İstanbul: SarmalKitabevi, ss. 129-131.

[74]Ibid., p. 132.

[75]Ibid.

[76]Ibid., p. 133.

[77]John Masefield (2025), Gelibolu, Ankara: HeceYayınları.

[78] Kadir Has Üniversitesi Türkiye ÇalışmalarıGrubu (2022), “Türk Dış PolitikasıKamuoyuAlgılarıAraştırması – 2022”, Date of Accession: 02.06.2026 from https://www.khas.edu.tr/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/TDP_2022_TUR_FINAL_05.09.2022.pdf.

[79]Hüseyin Bağcı& Polat Üründül (2024), “Is Britain Great in Türkiye? The Image of Britain in Turkish Public Opinion”, in (eds. by Ozan Örmeci & Gürol Baba & Oğuzhan Göksel) Türkiye-Britain Relations: Two Hundred Years of an Intertwined Conflict and Cooperation, Lexington Books, p. 283.

[80]Ibid.

[81]BBC News Türkçe(2026), “Türkiye ileİngilterearasındaStratejikOrtaklıkÇerçeveBelgesiimzalandı”, 24.04.2026, Date of Accession: 02.06.2026 from https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/c62ky4rn4dro.

[82]PaMedia (2023), “The UK Government is guaranteeing a £680 million loan for a high-speed railway in Turkey”, 28.07.2023, Date of Accession: 28.06.2026 from https://pa.media/blogs/fact-check/the-uk-government-is-guaranteeing-a-680-million-loan-for-a-high-speed-railway-in-turkey/.